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This article analyzes the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) from the perspec-
tive of  the recent extraordinary wave of  populism in Europe. It argues that populism poses 
a serious and distinctive challenge to the ECtHR since supranational judicial review is at 
odds with the populist ideology. What makes the populist challenge distinctive is the com-
bination of  the ideological basis of  populism, its wide appeal and capacity to reach ordinary 
people, and populists’ tendency to remove limitations on their power. With respect to the last 
point, the article introduces a categorization of  anti-court techniques and takes stock of  the 
ECtHR’s institutional setting. It concludes that although the situation is not perfect—the 
budget and judicial selection are especially problematic—the ECtHR is rather well insulated 
from eventual attacks targeting its structural features or the judicial personnel. However, in-
cluding the ECtHR in the “narrative of  blame,” populism is very strong in another anti-court 
strategy—achieving gradual erosion of  a court through delegitimization. That is particularly 
threatening for the ECtHR due to its vulnerability to legitimacy challenges manifested in the 
past decade. As a result, the populist challenge will likely require careful management of  the 
ECtHR’s social legitimacy.
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1. Introduction
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) and the 
European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR or the Strasbourg Court) have been 
characterized as “the most effective human rights regime in the world”1 or as “the 
crown jewel of  the world’s most advanced international system for protecting civil and 
political liberties.”2 However, for some time, the Strasbourg Court has been “under 
substantial pressure”3 resulting from criticism and resistance against the ECtHR. 
Contemporary social and political developments in Europe do not suggest that the 
pressure is going to ease anytime soon. In particular, the “populist explosion”4 has 
resulted in even greater pressure being imposed on the Strasbourg Court, as the ex-
traordinary rise of  populism arguably amounts to the largest political transformation 
of  Europe since the end of  the Cold War.5 Indeed, populist leaders have portrayed the 
ECtHR as “a threat to the security of  the EU people,”6 a useless “European circus,”7 
and a “ravening monster.”8 Despite that, the populist challenge to the ECtHR has not 
yet been sufficiently explored. The aim of  this article is to explain how and why the 
rise of  populism challenges and may eventually threaten the ECtHR’s independence, 
authority, and legitimacy.
The article argues that the populist challenge to the Strasbourg Court is distinc-
tive due to the combination of  the ideological basis of  populism, populists’ style of  
political communication, and its resonance within the general public. These features 
imply that the recent surge of  populism presents a particularly pressing challenge for 
the ECtHR. Given the ideological mismatch between populism and the ECtHR’s perfor-
mance and the tendency of  populist leaders to remove limitations on their power, the 
article examines how the Strasbourg Court is situated to withstand eventual populist 
attacks. It concludes that the ECtHR is quite well insulated from two major anti-court 
strategies—limiting a court’s ability to interfere with the given agenda (e.g. by jurisdic-
tion stripping, paralyzing the court), and “taming” the court by targeting its judicial 
1 Alec Stone Sweet & Hellen Keller, Introduction: The Reception of  the ECHR in National Legal Orders, in A 
EuropE of rights: thE impAct of thE Echr on nAtionAl lEgAl systEms 11 (Hellen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet 
eds., 2012).
2 Laurence Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of  Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of  the European Human Rights Regime, 19 Eur. J. int’l l. 125, 125 (2008).
3 criticism of thE EuropEAn court of humAn rights 3 (Patricia Popelier, Sarah Lambrecht, & Koen Lemmens 
eds., 2016).
4 John Judis, thE populist Explosion (2016).
5 Martin Eiermann, Yascha Mounk, & Limor Gultchin, European Populism: Trends, Threats and Future 
Prospects, institutE for globAl chAngE (Dec 29, 2017), available at https://institute.global/insight/
renewing-centre/european-populism-trends-threats-and-future-prospects.
6 Orban attacks the European Court of  Human Rights, EurActiV.com (2017), available at https://www.
euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/orban-attacks-the-european-court-of-human-rights-at-epp-
congress/.
7 Italy violated human rights of  mafia boss, thE locAl (Oct 25, 2018), available at https://www.thelocal.
it/20181025/italy-violated-human-rights-of-mafia-boss-eu-court.
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personnel. Although the ECtHR’s situation is not perfect—the budgetary and judicial 
selection issues are especially serious—the ECtHR is rather well-equipped to prevent or 
withstand eventual attacks on its structural features and judicial personnel, thanks to 
the decentralization of  the system, a rather high level of  judicial self-governance, and 
institutional safeguards of  judicial independence.
However, the populist era makes another, less straightforward strategy particularly 
threatening—sidelining the court through a gradual erosion of  its authority and so-
cial legitimacy on the domestic level. The combination of  populist ideology and polit-
ical style can be very powerful in achieving such gradual erosion. Populism provides 
an ideology resulting in a constitutional vision criticizing current liberal-democratic 
structures and addressing how “real” democracy should work. Populists then tend 
to include international human rights courts in the “narrative of  blame,” which 
explains who is responsible for the current problems of  the people and how to resolve 
them. This narrative increasingly resonates in the general public since it addresses the 
people’s increasing fear of  losing socioeconomic and identity status due to the lack of  
political control over these matters. By including the Strasbourg Court in the narra-
tive of  blame and channeling the people’s resentment against the ECtHR, populists 
possess a significant capacity to mobilize the people—possibly even across countries—
and shift the discursive frame surrounding the ECtHR, which can distort the social 
and political origins of  the ECtHR’s independence and authority. Such a scenario is 
particularly dangerous for the Strasbourg Court since the populist main strength 
matches the ECtHR’s weakness in vulnerability to delegitimization manifested in the 
past decade. In other words, the most challenging implication of  the populist wave for 
the Strasbourg Court is the changing sociopolitical perception of  human rights adju-
dication in Europe.
The novel contribution of  this article is threefold. First, by analyzing both the ideational 
basis of  populism and the actual populist challenges to the ECtHR, the article explains the 
ideological mismatch between populism and international human rights adjudication and 
shows its manifestations in Europe. Second, the article introduces a novel categorization of  
techniques used to limit judicial power and discipline courts, and examines the ECtHR’s re-
silience through the prism of  this categorization. As a result, it presents populism not merely 
as a vague threat to the rule of  law actors, but points out its real dangers in the setting of  a 
particular institution—the ECtHR. Finally, the analysis shows that formal mechanisms of  
judicial independence guarding the structural features of  a court and its judicial personnel 
might not be sufficient when facing the populist challenges. Elaborating on the scenario of  a 
gradual erosion of  the Strasbourg Court’s authority by delegitimization, the article explains 
that managing the ECtHR’s social legitimacy is of  crucial importance in the populist age.
The rest of  the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reconstructs populism as an 
ideology and a constitutional project in order to understand the populist irritation 
with independent (international) judicial review. Since populists in power tend to 
consolidate their positions and eliminate limitations on their rule, Section 3 uses a 
new categorization of  anti-court techniques, examines the Strasbourg Court’s institu-
tional setting, and assesses the risks and resources in the ECtHR’s design vis-à-vis the 
populist challenge. Section 4 concludes.
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2. Populism as an ideology and constitutional project: 
A threat to international human rights courts?
In the political discourse, populism is regularly used as a label to humiliate polit-
ical opponents and blame them for demagogy or opportunism.9 Populism, however, 
amounts to something more. Scholars have described populism as a particular polit-
ical style, political movement, strategy, or discourse.10 In this vein, populism has been 
associated with strong political mobilization of  the masses by a charismatic leader,11 
with radicalization of  the emotional element in politics,12 and with seeking an exercise 
of  power based on “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large num-
bers of  mostly unorganized followers.”13
Besides that, populism has been studied as a distinct political ideology. It is a thin 
ideology that does not offer a complete map of  the world in the same way as liberalism 
or socialism. Populism rather provides a set of  ideas “about how democracy can and 
should work, and how leaders can and should relate to the people.”14 Mudde put forth 
the following influential definition of  populism:
[A]n ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and an-
tagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of  the volonté générale (general will) of  the people.15
Similarly, other authors point out populism’s emphasis on the exaltation of  popular 
sovereignty, majority rule, homogeneity of  the people, and antagonism towards the 
elite.16 Beyond these common features, however, populism takes on many forms. In 
a chameleon-like way, it is combined with different political ideas leading to varieties 
of  populism.17 When referring to populism throughout this article, I have in mind the 
version which currently dominates in European politics and, therefore, is the most 
pressing for the ECtHR—populism tied with significant exclusionary, ethno-national, 
and anti-pluralist elements.18 The anti-pluralism results in claims for the exclusive 
representation of  the people and the popular will: “[P]opulists claim that they, and only 
9 Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 goV’t And opposition 542, 542–43 (2004).
10 See Takis Pappas, Modern Populism: Research Advances, Conceptual and Methodological Pitfalls, and the 
Minimal Definition, in oxford rEsEArch EncyclopEdiA of politics (2016).
11 michAEl kAzin, thE populist pErsuAsion 1 (1998).
12 cArlos dE lA torrE, populist sEduction in lAtin AmEricA 4 (2010).
13 Kurt Weyland, Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of  Latin American Politics, 34 comp. pol. 
1, 14 (2001).
14 Aziz Z. Huq, The People Against the Constitution, 116 michigAn l.rEV. 1123, 1132 (2018).
15 Mudde, supra note 9, at 543.
16 E.g. Margaret Canovan, Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of  Democracy, in dEmocrAciEs And 
thE populist chAllEngE 25 (Yves Mény & Yves Surel eds., 2002); Nadia Urbinati, The Populist Phenomenon, 
51 rAisons politiquEs 137 (2013).
17 pAul tAggArt, populism 2–4 (2000).
18 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing 
Contemporary Europe and Latin America, 48 goV’t And opposition 147, 155 (2013); Bojan Bugaric, The Two 
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they, represent the people.”19 Such anti-pluralism has significant illiberal implications, 
as the following sections show.20 Thus, I mostly address what other scholars label as 
authoritarian populism.21
2.1. The building blocks of  the populist ideology
As an ideology, populism is based on a specific understanding of  fundamental 
concepts of  constitutional and political theory. The combination of  specific visions of  
the people, popular will, and the concept of  the political and constitutional identity 
leads populists to a constitutional project, which is impatient with checks on the pop-
ular will. In order to understand the populist challenge to the ECtHR and build my 
argument, it is first necessary to examine the populist vision of  these concepts.
The populist view of  the people is anti-elitist, anti-pluralistic, and anti-
individualistic. The starting point of  populism is a bipolar account of  society—us 
versus them. The society is seen to be divided into two groups: the (common, or-
dinary, or real) people and the elite. Accordingly, not all the members of  society 
form the people in the populist sense.22 The elite are defined broadly as the estab-
lishment—political, economic, cultural, and media elites deforming the will of  the 
real people.23 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser explain that the populist notion of  the 
people is both unifying and divisive. It aims to unify the majority and mobilize it 
against a common enemy—the elite.24 The populist notion of  the (common) people 
is vague, even fictional.25 Invoking the concept of  (common) people often refers 
to an undefined group excluded from power—the people feeling oppressed by the 
elites. Such a blurred conception allows populists to unite different social groups 
and generate their shared identity.26 Moreover, the bifurcation of  society is further 
reinforced by the moralistic appeal. The common people are seen as morally pure, 
whereas the elite are corrupt.27
The homogenous view of  the common people forms the basis for the populist 
conceptualization of  the popular will. It is essentially monist—there is one united 
people, with one set of  interests and one will.28 The one will of  the people is also well 
cognizable for the populist leaders since it stems from the shared consciousness of  
19 JAn-wErnEr müllEr, whAt is populism 20 (2016).
20 See also Gábor Halmai, Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism, 20 gEr. lAw J. 296 (2019); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 u. chicAgo l.rEV. 545 (2018).
21 E.g. pippA norris & rogEr inglEhArt, culturAl bAcklAsh: trump, brExit And thE risE of AuthoritAriAn populism 
(2018); Bojan Bugaric & Alenka Kuhelj, Varieties of  Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of  Law in Danger? 10 
hAguE J. rulE of lAw 21, 22 (2018). 
22 müllEr, supra note 19, at 21.
23 cAs muddE & cristóbAl roVirA kAltwAssEr, populism: A VEry short introduction 12 (2017).
24 Id. at 11; see also Canovan, supra note 16, at 34.
25 müllEr, supra note 19, at 20.
26 muddE & roVirA kAltwAssEr, supra note 23, at 9–10.
27 müllEr, supra note 19, at 24.
28 Luigi Corrias, Populism in a Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional 
Identity, 12 Eur. const. lAw rEV. 6, 11 (2016).








niverzita user on 29 O
ctober 2020
The populist challenge to the European Court of  Human Rights   481
the people—the common sense. In other words, politics is about the issues of  the 
common people being resolved according to the common sense.29 Hence, the content 
of  the popular will is not necessarily recognized through formalized processes of  con-
stitutional democracy, but rather intuitively deduced from the common sense shared 
by the real people.30 Such popular will is then perceived as normatively and morally 
supreme.31
As a matter of  practical politics, the popular will should be cognized and 
implemented in an authentic way.32 According to populism, the main task of  politics is 
to make the opinion expressed by the popular will identical to the authority expressed 
by the state.33 The populist understanding of  popular will is thus characterized by 
monism, self-evidence, moral correctness, and a demand for its authentic enforce-
ment. Authenticity of  the popular will’s materialization brings us to the next element 
of  populist ideological vision—the concept of  the political.
Populists criticize liberal democratic structures and constitutional procedures 
for deforming the popular will and depriving it of  authenticity. The institutions and 
procedures of  constitutional democracy have allegedly led to politics being replaced 
with mere administration.34 In combination with the restrictions of  policy choices 
coming from the international realm and from the liberal language of  political cor-
rectness, liberal constitutionalist structures turned the polities into “democracies 
without choices.”35
Populism aims to bring the authenticity of  the popular will back to politics and 
to repoliticize the public sphere.36 It builds on the Schmittian concept of  the polit-
ical and polarizes political conflict.37 The core of  politics is driven by antagonism be-
tween the people and the elite; without it, there is no politics, just administration.38 
Accordingly, the populist constitutional project refuses “the endless litigiousness” of  
liberal constitutionalism39 and the democratic limitations in-built in the design of  
a constitutional democracy.40 The same argument applies to limitations stemming 
from the international level.41 Overall, populism proclaims the primacy of  politics 
over law.42 Furthermore, populism tends to ignore the distinction between ordinary 
29 Mudde, supra note 9, at 547 and 560.
30 müllEr, supra note 19, at 26; Canovan, supra note 16, at 32.
31 Ben Stanley, The Thin Ideology of  Populism, 13 J. pol. idEologiEs 95, 101 (2008).
32 Id. at 104–05.
33 Urbinati, supra note 16, at 140.
34 Mudde, supra note 9, at 555.
35 Ivan Krastev, The Strange Death of  the Liberal Consensus, 18 J. dEmocrAcy 57, 60–61 (2007).
36 Mudde, supra note 9, at 555.
37 See cArl schmitt, thE concEpt of thE politicAl (1996).
38 Stanley, supra note 31, at 97.
39 Urbinati, supra note 16, at 147.
40 Margaret Canovan, Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of  Democracy, 47 pol. stud. 2 (1999); 
Mudde, supra note 9, at 561.
41 Paul Blokker, Populist Constitutionalism, VErfAssungsblog (May 4, 2017), available at http://verfassungsblog.
de/populist-constitutionalism/.
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and constitutional politics43 which leads to primacy of  the popular will even over the 
constitution.44 The Schmittian ideas are invoked again—the constituent power of  the 
people is always present and can be exercised by the people: “In a democracy the people 
is the sovereign; it can break through the entire system of  constitutional norms.”45
Another element of  populist thinking is constitutional identity. According to 
Jacobsohn, constitutional identity “represents a mix of  political aspirations and 
commitments that are expressive of  a nation’s past, as well as the determination of  
those within the society who seek in some ways to transcend that past.”46 Constitutional 
identity then serves as the basis for the construction of  social and legal relationships 
in a given polity.47 Similarly, Rosenfeld argues that constitutional identity is a re-
flection of  an imagined community that needs to construe a “distinct self-image.”48 
Constitutional identity serves as a “frame of  reference and a narrative allowing it to 
perceive itself  as a constituted imagined community.”49 Construing a specific narra-
tive amounting to constitutional identity is crucial for populism. Unity of  the common 
people implies a united constitutional identity.50 Such a constitutional identity often 
takes a form of  a (mythical) historical narrative about the greatness of  the people.51 In 
reaction to identity concerns triggered by the rise of  cosmopolitanism, populist consti-
tutional identity often manifests as a “localist counter-movement ... that profess[es] to 
represent a given polity’s, region’s or a community’s ‘genuine’ identity.”52
In the populist key, the historical and/or identitarian dimension of  constitutional 
identity is often complemented with what I call “the narrative of  blame.” Populism 
frequently rises from discontent with the current situation and thrives due to people’s 
frustration, anxiety, and fear of  the future. Accordingly, there is a demand for the po-
litical forces opposing the current system.53 The supply side of  populism—populist 
leaders—provides narratives that explain the causes and the meanings of  the anxiety: 
“[H]ere is what is happening, this is why, and these are the people doing it to you.”54 
Hence, the populist constitutional identity narrative is often antagonistic and seeks to 
identify and blame those guilty of  causing the anxiety of  the common people.55
43 Paul Blokker, The Populist Threat to Democratic Constitutionalism, Eui blog (Nov 14, 2017) https://blogs.eui.
eu/constitutionalism-politics-working-group/populist-constitutionalism-4-populist-threat-democratic-
constitutionalism/.
44 Oran Doyle, Populist Constitutionalism and Constituent Power, 20 gEr. lAw J. 161, 162 (2019).
45 cArl schmitt, VErfAssungslEhrE 275 (1928). See also Heiner Bielefeldt, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of  Liberalism, 
in lAw As politics: cArl schmitt’s critiquE of libErAlism 23, 28 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2014).
46 gAry JAcobsohn, constitutionAl idEntity 7 (2010).
47 Id. at 8.
48 Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in thE oxford hAndbook of compArAtiVE constitutionAl lAw 756, 
759 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
49 Id. at 759.
50 Corrias, supra note 28, at 13.
51 Id. at 13; Urbinati, supra note 16, at 139.
52 Ran Hirschl, Opting Out of  “Global Constitutionalism”, 12 lAw & Ethics of humAn rights 1, 35 (2018).
53 Dani Rodrik, Populism and the Economics of  Globalization, 1 J. int’l bus. pol’y 12, 24 (2018).
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Krastev, supra note 35.
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2.2. Populist constitutional project: Against courts, technocrats, and 
the supranational?
The combination of  the populist understanding of  the four elements of  populist ide-
ology explains populist unease with the idea of  limiting power through checks and 
balances stemming from constitutional and international structures. The populist ide-
ology is too impatient with checks on the popular will as cognized by populist leaders.
Liberal constitutionalism values checks and balances for limiting the government 
and preventing tyranny, increasing the expertise of  governance, and ensuring legit-
imacy for government policies.56 Checks and balances also protect the people from 
their own possibly erroneous momentary passions by making the system of  deci-
sion-making decentralized and time-consuming. Populism either does not see these 
values as desirable or does not believe that checks and balances deliver them. According 
to populism, checks and balances actors compromise the authenticity of  the popular 
will. Moreover, they are unnecessary and ineffective because the solution of  the ordi-
nary people’s problems is simple and self-evident.57 Thus, within the ideational view, 
the (authoritarian) populist constitutional project is against the constraints imposed 
upon the will of  the common people and tends to reject pluralism, minority rights, 
and institutions designed to protect them.58 These legal structures and institutions 
are often included in the narrative of  blame as sources of  the people’s frustration. 
For the same reasons, populism is usually against technocratic and non-majoritarian 
institutions, which can be easily portrayed as “institutionalised elitism and a threat to 
democracy.”59
The rise of  judicial power comes to the forefront in this regard. The global spread of  
judicial review of  legislation turned constitutional or supreme courts into one of  the 
central actors of  democratic lawmaking.60 Certain issues were taken out of  majority 
control and placed under the protection of  judges. Also, the ordinary courts, which 
lack the power of  constitutional review, regularly influence public policies as a result 
of  a judicial review of  administrative acts and a review of  the consistency of  statutes 
with international human rights treaties or EU law.61 Since courts and judges are gen-
erally more powerful and have a greater say in the system of  democratic governance, 
many populist leaders tried to control the courts once they got into power.
Besides judicializing politics through domestic courts, the recent past has brought 
about another trend—the proliferation of  international adjudication.62 International 
56 Jenny Martinez, Horizontal Structuring, in thE oxford hAndbook of compArAtiVE constitutionAl lAw 547, 
548 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
57 Canovan, supra note 40, at 6.
58 muddE & roVírA kAltwAssEr, supra note 23, at 81.
59 frAnk VibErt, thE risE of thE unElEctEd: dEmocrAcy And thE nEw sEpArAtion of powErs 3 (2007).
60 E.g. AlEc stonE swEEt, goVErning with JudgEs (2000); Ran Hirschl, Judicialization of  Politics, in thE oxford 
hAndbook of lAw And politics (Gregory Caldeira et al., 2008).
61 Leonard Besselink, The Proliferation of  Constitutional Law and Constitutional Adjudication, or How American 
Judicial Review Came to Europe After All, 9 utrEcht l. rEV. 19 (2013).
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courts (ICs) were designed to influence state behavior and shift states towards com-
pliance with international law. During the past decades, many ICs have undergone 
significant transformations. Scholars even refer to a paradigm shift in their creation 
and use.63 At least some of  the “new” ICs have become more powerful and fulfill roles 
that go far beyond merely resolving inter-state disputes. There is also wider access 
to ICs, further domestic embeddedness, and some ICs have gained a higher degree 
of  independence from state control.64 As a result, the authority of  ICs—the ECtHR 
among them at the forefront—and their power to alter domestic politics has notably 
increased.65 A related issue is the populist resentment towards international human 
rights law, especially towards its universalistic aspirations. International human 
rights norms are viewed as particularly non-democratic and individualistic obstacles 
to domestic popular will and identity.66 As a result, there is a certain irritation of  popu-
lism with international human rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies, as well as with 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helping to bring cases before those bodies.67
The rise of  ICs illustrates a more general tendency—the internationalization of  
limits imposed on majoritarian governance. Globalization and the increased influ-
ence of  international organizations, international NGOs, and corporations have been 
understood by populism as external obstacles constraining the realization of  the au-
thentic popular will by the international unaccountable elites. Populists thus com-
monly include international actors and the national leaders supporting them in the 
narrative of  blame.68 In Europe, populism is regularly coupled with Euroscepticism 
criticizing the elitist and non-representative nature of  European integration.69
According to Posner, recent events even show that the post-Cold War liberal inter-
nationalism might have reached its limits.70 The benefits of  globalization were not 
equally distributed, and many have the feeling of  being left behind by globalization 
and international institutions.71 Populist leaders have been able to argue that inter-
national decision makers act in the interest of  elites, not ordinary people. As a result, 
“international institutions have provided a convenient target for populists, as have 
the national leaders who have supported them. The populists have been able to blame 
globalization and international law for insecurity and economic dislocation as a way 
to undermine the establishment elites who constructed them.”72
63 kArEn AltEr, thE nEw tErrAin of intErnAtionAl lAw 3 (2014).
64 Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate 
and Transnational, 54 int’l org. 457, 469 (2000); Karen Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-
Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 l. & contEmp. probs. 37 (2008).
65 Karen Alter, Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction of  International and Domestic 
Politics, 13 cAmbridgE yEArbook of EuropEAn lEgAl studiEs 1 (2011). But see infra note 97, and Section 3 of  
this article.
66 Blokker, supra note 41.
67 Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. hum. rts. prAc. 1 (2017).
68 Rodrik, supra note 53, at 25.
69 Paul Taggart, Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe, 9 J. pol. idEologiEs 269, 
270 (2004).
70 Eric Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49 ArizonA st. l. J. 795, 812–13 (2017).
71 michAEl J. trEbilcock, dEAling with losErs (2014).
72 Posner, supra note 70, at 816.
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Overall, the illiberal drive against checks and balances and against limitations 
on power is common for populism as an ideology and for the politics of  populist 
strongmen in power. However, this does not necessarily hold true for all the populist 
voters: “Even voters who disagree with the simplistic solutions proposed by populist 
leaders may find reassurance in their brazen confrontation of  issues that have too 
long fallen outside of  political discourse.”73 As Mounk has argued, support for populist 
actors is mostly driven by the people’s anxiety about the future, and fear of  losing their 
current identitarian, economic, and social status.74 In this respect, it is reasonable to 
admit that populism identifies some important problems of  liberal constitutional de-
mocracy which have been overlooked or silenced for a long time—especially the ten-
sion between individualism and cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and collectivism 
and particularism on the other hand.75 Arditi therefore likens populism to an “awk-
ward dinner guest” who drank too much and asked inappropriate questions contrary 
to good table manners. These questions may nevertheless point to some significant 
hidden problems.76
How do the ICs and the ECtHR in particular fit in? Identitarian and democratic 
deficits of  judicialized and internationalized governance belong among the overlooked 
problems.77 It is fair to say that the ECtHR judicializes many areas, including core moral 
and political issues (such as security or immigration) that are of  utmost concern to the 
people. Although there are good arguments in favor of  the ECtHR’s involvement in 
these areas, their judicialization “comes with a price.”78 One should acknowledge that 
judicializing such issues by an IC can contribute to their de-politicization and, thereby, 
to the anxiety of  the people stemming from the lack of  control over these pressing 
issues.79 Thus, although one does not need to support the simplistic solutions offered 
by the populist leaders and the narratives about international governance as an elitist 
conspiracy, taking into account the contribution of  international judicialization to 
the frustration and anxiety of  the people helps to understand the support for such 
solutions. This is an aspect which makes the populist narrative of  blame so appealing 
to many people and, at the same time, so threatening for the ECtHR.
To be clear, ICs, and the ECtHR in particular, have always been challenged.80 
Recently, the Strasbourg Court has been criticized by many audiences, including 
73 Sophia Gaston quoted in Judy Dempsey, Does Europe Have an Alternative to Populism? cArnEgiE EuropE (Aug. 
30, 2018) available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/77134?lang=en.
74 yAschA mounk, thE pEoplE Vs. dEmocrAcy 157 (2018). See also Eefje Steenvoorden & Eelco Harteveld, The 
Appeal of  Nostalgia: The Influence of  Societal Pessimism on Support for Populist Radical Right Parties, 41 wEst 
Eur. pol. 28 (2018).
75 Neil Walker, Populism and Constitutional Tension, 17 int’l J. const. l. 515 (2019).
76 bEnJAmin Arditi, politics on thE EdgEs of libErAlism 78 (2007).
77 Doreen Lustig & J. H. H. Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World—Retrospective and Prospective, 16 
int’l J. const. l. 315, 338–45 (2018); mounk, supra note 74, at 70–77; Walker, supra note 75.
78 Andrea Pin, The Transnational Drivers of  Populist Backlash in Europe: The Role of  Courts, 20 gEr. lAw J. 225, 
236 (2019).
79 Id., at 242. On the other hand, judicialization of  political issues tends to produce politicization of  courts. 
See John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 l. & contEmp. probs. 41, 64 (2002).
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national governments, judges, scholars, and the mainstream media. And although 
such criticism has sometimes made use of  elements of  the populist logic, this article 
argues that the populist challenge is particularly serious for the ECtHR. Although a 
thin ideology, populism provides a complex view of  how democracy should work. The 
populist reading of  the abovementioned concepts has strong implications and results 
in a particular constitutional vision. That vision contrasts with independent and ef-
fective international human rights adjudication. The high impact of  an international 
human rights court is seen not only as unsuitable, ineffective, or lacking democratic 
legitimacy. Populism provides a basis for criticizing such a practice as immoral, and 
as being hostile to the people and democracy as such. As a result, it offers an alter-
native constitutional project competing with pan-European liberal constitutionalism. 
Another essential feature of  populism is its broad appeal and capacity to mobilize the 
masses. Issues concerning the legitimacy of  ICs are most often formulated by elite ac-
tors from legal and political spheres.81 However, populism elevates this to another level. 
The populist narrative centered around the popular will; socioeconomic and identity 
concerns seem to have a higher capacity to mobilize and unite people—possibly even 
across borders—than the sovereigntist or counter-majoritarian critique of  ICs alone.82
However, populists in government use institutions in an instrumental way. They op-
pose and attack those institutions whose outcomes are not in line with their interests. 
As Müller put it, “[p]opulists are only against specific institutions—namely those 
which, in their view, fail to produce the morally ... correct political outcomes. But this 
form of  ‘anti-institutionalism’ is only articulated when populists are in opposition. 
Populists in power will be fine with institutions—which is to say: their institutions.”83 
In practice, (authoritarian) populists in government show a clear tendency to adjust 
the institutional landscape to their constitutional visions. Throughout the world, they 
have been trying to eliminate limitations on their executive power, change the elec-
toral rules, and restrict the independent media and civil society organizations if  these 
fail to produce their preferred outcomes.84 If  they cross the interest of  the populist 
leaders, courts are usually among the first targets of  the populist push against checks 
and balances.85 Nevertheless, populists in power do not need to abolish courts. It is suf-
ficient to prevent courts from imposing limits on the executive. Two general strategies 
are most often used to achieve that: limiting a court’s ability to interfere with the given 
agenda (e.g. by jurisdiction stripping, paralyzing the court), and “taming” the court 
by targeting the judicial personnel and harmonizing its outcomes with the populist 
objectives.86
81 Basak Çalı, Anne Koch, & Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of  Human Rights Courts: A Grounded Interpretivist 
Analysis of  the European Court of  Human Rights, 35 hum. rts. q. 955, 962 (2013).
82 In detail, see Section 3.3 providing actual examples.
83 Jan-Werner Müller, Populism and Constitutionalism, in thE oxford hAndbook of populism 590, 598 (Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017).
84 David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 u. chicAgo l. rEV. 521, 532 (2018); müllEr, supra note 19.
85 See Bojan Bugarič & Tom Ginsburg, The Assault on Postcommunist Courts, 27 J. dEmocrAcy 69, 73 (2016); 
stEVEn lEVitsky & dAniEl ziblAtt, how dEmocrAciEs diE 78–81 (2018).
86 Those strategies were visible for instance in the attacks on constitutional courts in Hungary and Poland—
see Bugarič & Ginsburg, supra note 85.
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What do the ideological underpinnings of  populism and the populists leaders’ ten-
dency to attack courts imply for the ECtHR? Many of  the reasons for populist irrita-
tion with powerful domestic courts are very relevant for the Strasbourg Court. The 
ECtHR has elevated human rights standards in Europe through its dynamic interpre-
tive methods.87 Its case law has permeated the jurisprudence of  domestic courts,88 
influenced national statutes and constitutions,89 and altered domestic political 
agendas.90 Specifically in the “new” European democracies, the ECtHR’s case law has 
also served as a human rights handbook,91 and an instrument to lock in democratic 
developments and prevent backsliding.92
In addition, the ECtHR’s case law is built on values that are at odds with the pop-
ulist ideology. The Strasbourg jurisprudence builds on individual rights, social plu-
ralism, universalism, and the protection of  minorities. In fact, the Strasbourg Court 
has already countered some policies of  the populist leaders. To name a few examples, 
during the 2005–07 populist era in Poland, the ECtHR ruled that Lech Kaczynski’s 
decision to ban a gay rights march in Warsaw violated the Convention.93 More re-
cently, the ECtHR addressed some of  the restrictions upon freedom of  expression 
in the aftermath of  the failed coup d’état in Turkey.94 Several Strasbourg judgments 
have concerned Orbán’s populist regime in Hungary too, in particular its immigra-
tion policies95 and the dismissal of  András Baka from the post of  president of  the 
Hungarian Supreme Court.96
All these aspects suggest that the ECtHR’s performance conflicts with populism. 
Given the abovementioned tendency of  authoritarian populist leaders to eliminate 
institutions that counter their political project, the rest of  this article takes stock of  
the ECtHR’s resilience. Section 3 examines the ECtHR’s setting through the prism of  
87 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of  the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 12 gEr. lAw J. 1730 (2011).
88 implEmEntAtion of thE EuropEAn conVEntion on humAn rights And of thE JudgmEnts of thE Ecthr in nAtionAl 
cAsE lAw 86 (Janneke Gerards & Joseph Fleuren eds., 2014).
89 David Kosař & Lucas Lixinski, Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts, 109 Am. 
J. int’l l. 713 (2015); thE EuropEAn court of humAn rights: implEmEnting strAsbourg’s JudgmEnts on domEstic 
policy (Dia Anagnostou ed., 2013); Stone Sweet & Keller, supra note 1.
90 Laurence Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of  Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in 
Europe, 68 int’l org. 77 (2014).
91 iuliA motoc & inEtA ziEmElE eds., thE impAct of thE Echr on dEmocrAtic chAngE in cEntrAl And EAstErn 
EuropE (2016).
92 Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of  Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 int’l 
org. 217 (2000).
93 Baczkowski and others v.  Poland, App. No. 1543/06, Eur. ct. hum. rts., May 3, 2007. Ben Stanley, 
Confrontation by Default and Confrontation by Design: Strategic and Institutional Responses to Poland’s Populist 
Coalition Government, 23 dEmocrAtizAtion 263, 273–74 (2016).
94 Alpay v.  Turkey, App. No. 16538/17, Eur. ct. hum. rts., March 20, 2018; Altan v.  Turkey, App. No. 
13237/17, Eur. ct. hum. rts., March 20, 2018.
95 E.g. Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, App. No. 47287/15, Eur. ct. hum. rts., March 3, 2017.
96 Baka v. Hungary, App. No. 20261/12, Eur. ct. hum. rts., June 23, 2016; David Kosař & Katarína Šipulová, 
The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: Baka v. Hungary and the Rule of  Law, 10 hAguE J. rulE 
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the most common anti-court techniques, and seeks to identify the risks and resources 
built into the Strasbourg Court’s design.
3. Stocktaking the ECtHR’s independence safeguards
Backlashes against (international) courts are not a new phenomenon.97 Throughout 
history, there have been many attempts to limit or control both domestic and inter-
national judiciaries, using various anti-court techniques.98 This section examines the 
ECtHR’s setting through the prism of  the most common anti-court techniques. Table 1 
introduces their novel categorization built on an extensive survey of  secondary lit-
erature on limiting judicial power and disciplining both domestic and international 
judges. The common denominator of  the techniques is the effort to decrease the 
court’s authority and capacity to act as a veto point. They are categorized according to 
the target of  the technique—the structural features of  a court, its judges, and its social 
legitimacy. The identified techniques are not distinctively populist. They can be em-
ployed by actors of  any political affiliation. The categorization can therefore be used 
for the analysis of  various challenges to any court. But since Section 2 argued that 
populism made targeting courts more likely and presents an imminent challenge for 
the Strasbourg Court, the point here is to assess the strengths and weaknesses of  the 
ECtHR system and find out how well-designed the Strasbourg Court is to withstand 
the eventual use of  those techniques.
97 In recent scholarship, see Wayne Sandholtz, Yining Bei, & Kayla Caldwell, Backlash and International 
Human Rights Courts, in contrActing humAn rights 159 (Alison Brysk & Michael Stohl eds., 2018); 
Mikael Rask Madsen, Paula Cebulak, & Micha Wiebusch, Backlash against International Courts: 
Explaining the Forms and Patterns of  Resistance to International Courts, 14 int. J.l.  in contExt 197 
(2018); Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, pErspEctiVEs on politics 
(forthcoming).
98 The term “anti-court techniques” is a simplification. Some of  the techniques can be used in legitimate 
ways to promote judicial accountability or efficiency. In this article, however, I stress their negative poten-
tial and focus on instances when the techniques are employed in a “wicked” way.
Table 1. Anti-court techniques
Structural features of  a court Judicial personnel Social legitimacy
Abolishing a court Removing disloyal judges Exit
Jurisdiction stripping Making judges loyal Exit threats
Changing access and  
procedural rules
Appointing loyal judges Criticism
Non-compliance
Intervening in the internal  
workings of  a court
 
Docket control   
Restricting budget   
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3.1. Targeting the ECtHR’s structural features
One of  the goals of  targeting the judiciary is to limit courts’ ability to interfere with 
the populist agenda. The most straightforward way is to abolish the court and even-
tually replace it with a new institution.99 Courts’ power can also be reduced by juris-
diction stripping.100 A  different technique used for preventing a court from deciding 
certain cases is changing the rules of  access. Making access to the court difficult can 
lead to control of  the court’s docket.101 A powerful tool capable of  paralyzing a court 
is changing procedural rules and intervening in the inner working of  the court. Raising the 
majority necessary for adopting a decision or introducing strict rules on the order of  
dealing with cases, for instance, can reduce a court’s agility.102 Reducing the budget of  
a court represents another technique.103 Budgetary constraints can be used by states 
and international organizations to discipline or reward a court for its decisions and 
functioning.104 Besides that, having an insufficient budget can paralyze a court as it 
prevents it from functioning properly. Budgetary support has important implications 
for the working conditions at a court—IT support and other equipment, building 
maintenance, number of  personnel, etc.105
With the exception of  the budget, the ECtHR is quite well protected against attacks 
on its structural features. The main strengths of  the Strasbourg system are its decen-
tralization, which leads to de facto entrenchment of  the fundamental features of  the 
ECHR, and a notable degree of  judicial self-governance. These two features make many 
of  the listed anti-court techniques impossible or very hard to employ.
By decentralization I mean the plurality of  governing actors. The ECtHR is part of  
the Council of  Europe (CoE), which consists of  forty-seven member states who are 
the masters of  the Convention. The Convention itself  regulates the most critical issues 
concerning the structural features of  the ECtHR, such as the inner structure of  the 
Court, its jurisdiction and competences, access rules, etc. Thus, the states parties have 
to contend with a particularly high threshold for changing the structural features of  
the ECtHR. They face a “joint decision trap,”106 where higher level decisions (decisions 
regarding the ECtHR) can be blocked by any lower level actor (a CoE state). It implies 
99 lEVitsky & ziblAtt, supra note 85, at 80–81.
100 dAVid kosAř, pErils of JudiciAl sElf-goVErnmEnt in trAnsitionAl sociEtiEs 95–96 (2016); Keith Rosenn, The 
Protection of  Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 intEr-AmEricAn l. rEV. 1, 24 (1987).
101 Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz, The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Transition—from Actio Popularis to 
Constitutional Complaint, 53 ActA JuridicA hungAricA 302 (2012).
102 woJciEch sAdurski, polAnd’s constitutionAl brEAkdown 61–79 (2019), mapping the paralysis of  the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal.
103 Although budgetary constraints stand out somewhat among other techniques targeting the structural 
features of  a court, I include them in this category since they target the whole court rather than indi-
vidual judges and, like the other structural techniques, can impair the court’s capacity to act.
104 Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts, in thE oxford hAndbook of intErnAtionAl 
AdJudicAtion 484, 493 (Cesare Romano et al., 2013).
105 kosAř, supra note 100, at 94.
106 Fritz Scharpf, The Joint-decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, 66 pub. 
Admin. 239 (1988); R. Daniel Kelemen, The Political Foundations of  Judicial Independence in the European 
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that the structural features of  the Strasbourg Court, which are enshrined directly in 
the Convention, are de facto entrenched.
In this way, the Strasbourg Court is protected from the most straightforward attacks 
targeting structural features. Abolition of  the ECtHR, jurisdiction stripping as well as 
changing the access and (some of) the procedural rules all require the Convention to 
be amended. Given the number of  states parties and their political diversity, it is un-
likely that there would be no veto players to block an attack of  this kind. However, that 
does not mean that individual states or groups of  like-minded states cannot start a 
campaign against the Court and informally, through political channels, influence its 
functioning.107
The second strong feature is the high degree of  judicial self-governance (JSG) in 
matters of  the inner working of  the Court.108 Its basic aspects are included in the 
Convention. Particular decisions on the inner workings of  the ECtHR are then made 
by the Strasbourg judges themselves. The Rules of  Court, adopted by the Strasbourg 
judges, regulate procedural rules that could eventually be misused in order to at-
tack the ECtHR, such as the order of  dealing with cases or voting and the necessary 
majorities to adopt a decision.109 Hence, trying to paralyze the Strasbourg Court by 
changing the procedural rules would be very complicated due to the combination of  
decentralization and JSG.
This combination of  decentralization and JSG also protects the Strasbourg Court 
from meddling in the composition of  the chambers and targeting the key personnel in 
the Registry. The Convention stipulates that the ECtHR consists of  the plenary court 
and the chambers, that it shall have a Registry and that there should be a President 
and one or two Vice-Presidents of  the Court. Exercising JSG, the ECtHR judges 
themselves set up the chambers, elect the President, Vice-President(s), Registrar, 
and deputy Registrar(s), and adopt the rules of  the Court (Article 25 ECHR). The 
rules of  the Court then specify the inner functioning of  the ECtHR with respect to 
the Presidency of  the Court, the Registry, the forming and functioning of  the cham-
bers (sections), committees, and single-judge formations, as well as sessions and 
deliberations of  the Court.
The strategy of  budgetary restrictions remains to be addressed. The Strasbourg Court 
does not have a separate budget; it forms a part of  the overall CoE budget, which is sub-
ject to the approval by the Committee of  Ministers (CoM).110 CoE as such is financed by 
the forty-seven member states. The contribution of  each state is fixed, taking into ac-
count the population and GNP of  the state.111 Therefore, the contributions by states are 
not equal, which problematizes the logic of  the decentralization argument. A major 
107 See Section 3.3.
108 On JSG at the ECtHR, see Başak Çalı & Stewart Cunningham, Judicial Self  Government and the Sui Generis 
Case of  the European Court of  Human Rights, 19 gEr. lAw J. 1977 (2018); Nino Tsereteli & Hubert Smekal, 
The Judicial Self-Government at the International Level—A New Research Agenda, 19 gEr. lAw J. 2137 (2018).
109 ECtHR, Rules of  Court (Apr 16, 2018), available at https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_
ENG.pdf.
110 ECHR Budget, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Budget_ENG.pdf.
111 Id.
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donor’s failure to contribute can harm the ECtHR’s situation significantly. Moreover, 
according to Lambert-Abdelgawad, the Strasbourg Court is “evidently under-funded,” 
given its caseload.112 That has gotten even worse recently since Russia—one of  the 
major contributors—announced in 2017 it would stop contributing to the CoE 
budget.113 In addition, Turkey also withdrew from its status as a major donor to the 
CoE budget.114 These developments may lead to further reductions in the ECtHR’s 
under-funded budget and significantly impair the Strasbourg Court’s effectiveness.115
3.2. Targeting judicial personnel
Since courts consist of  individual judges who are crucial for the court’s deci-
sion-making, many anti-court techniques aim to “tame” the judicial personnel. There 
are two main ways to do this: install new loyal judges or make the incumbent judges 
loyal. Appointing loyal judges requires the removal of  disloyal judges, or the possibility 
to “pack” the court, that is, increase its size and fill the bench with loyalists.116
Judges can be removed using various techniques, including impeachment117 or 
misuse of  disciplinary motions.118 A less straightforward move is to reduce the salary of  
a judge or judicial salaries as such, which may force some judges to resign.119 Another 
possibility is to reduce the compulsory retirement age of  judges.120 The last technique 
is intimidation of  individual judges. Intimidating phone calls to a judge or her family, 
threats, or even physical intimidation can all create a climate of  fear, which may lead a 
judge to resign.121 Once places on the bench are vacant, the actors aiming to tame the 
court can appoint loyal figures to the bench. Sometimes, though, they do not bother 
to remove the incumbent judges but rather pack the court—they increase the number 
of  judges and fill the new positions with loyalists.122
112 Elizabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, Measuring the Judicial Performance of  the European Court of  Human Rights, 
8 int’l J. ct. Admin. 20, 23 (2017).
113 This step was a response to the decision of  the Parliamentary Assembly of  the Council of  Europe (PACE) 
to suspend Russia’s voting rights in the Assembly in reaction to the 2014 occupation of  Crimea. PACE, 
Resolution 1990 (2014), available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.
asp?fileid=20882&lang=en.
114 Jennifer Rankin, Human rights body faces cash crisis after clash with Russia, guArdiAn 
(Mar 16, 2018), available at https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/mar/16/
human-rights-body-faces-cash-crisis-after-clash-with-russia?CMP=share_btn_tw.
115 Lize Glas, The Assembly’s Row with Russia and Its Repercussions for the Convention System, 
strAsbourg obsErVErs (Oct 30, 2017).  available at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/10/30/
the-assemblys-row-with-russia-and-its-repercussions-for-the-convention-system/.
116 Andrea Castagnola & Aníbal Pérez Liñan, Bolivia: The Rise (and Fall) of  Judicial Review, in courts in lAtin 
AmEricA 278, 303 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2014).
117 Id., at 297–8.
118 kosAř, supra note 100, at 77.
119 Castagnola & Pérez Liñan, supra note 116, at 283, 296 and 298.
120 E.g. Gábor Halmai, The Early Retirement Age of  the Hungarian Judges, in Eu lAw storiEs: contExtuAl And 
criticAl historiEs of EuropEAn JurisprudEncE 471, 488 (Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies eds., 2017).
121 Jessica Walsh, A Double-Edged Sword: Judicial Independence and Accountability in Latin America, 1, 23 int’l 
bAr Ass’n rEp. (2016).
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Another way to tame a court is to make the current judges loyal. That can be done 
through threatening to employ the techniques described for removing judges. Yet, 
using carrots instead of  sticks can work as well. Incumbent judges can be promised a 
promotion, perhaps to a higher court, to the position of  chamber president, or (vice-)
president of  a court.123 Alternatively, current judges can be promised higher salaries 
or even direct bribes. An important and highly debated technique is the reappointment 
of  judges.124 Some courts—mostly constitutional and international courts—provide 
for limited but renewable terms. In such cases, political actors can use their power of  
reappointment to make judges decide in their preferred direction. Finally, even if  re-
appointment is not allowed, judges serving a limited term will likely care about their 
future career, thus they are largely dependent on the government to secure them com-
parable positions. That fact can be used to put pressure on a judge.125 Given the nature 
of  international judgeship—time-limited terms, location in a foreign country, etc.—
some of  those carrots may be particularly tempting in the context of  an IC.
The Strasbourg Court is relatively well designed to prevent or resist techniques 
targeting judicial personnel. The main advantages of  the system are decentralization, 
strong judicial independence safeguards, the JSG element in the selection of  judges, and 
notable JSG in promoting and disciplining judges.
Misusing disciplinary motions is difficult because of  the disciplinary self-governance 
of  ECtHR judges, combined with its de facto entrenchment in the Convention.126 
As a result, influencing the Court through affecting dismissal proceedings is un-
likely. Observation of  practice confirms this. The dismissal mechanism has not been 
used yet.127 As to the possibility of  salary reduction, judicial salaries are linked to the 
pay scale for CoE staff  members based in France.128 In 2016, the gross salary was 
€16,613.78 per month129 and the salary is not subject to income tax.130 Such finan-
cial security seems to be sufficient to secure judicial independence, especially when 
compared to other international human rights courts. A  judge’s position at the 
IACtHR, for instance, is not full-time and the judges therefore do not receive regular 
salaries but only “emoluments and travel allowances … for the importance and inde-
pendence of  their office.”131
123 kosAř, supra note 100, at 83, 85–86.
124 Laurence Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Theory of  Constrained Independence, 23 conf. 
nEw pol. Econ. 253 (2005).
125 Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in intErdisciplinAry pErspEctiVEs on intErnAtionAl lAw And 
intErnAtionAl rElAtions 421, 433 (Mark Pollack & Jeffrey Dunnof  eds., 2012).
126 Article 23 (4) ECHR.
127 Jeffrey Dunoff  & Mark Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 Am. J. int’l l. 225, 249 (2017).
128 Article 3 (1), Committee of  Ministers Resolution CM/Res(2009)5 on the status and conditions of  service 
of  judges of  the European Court of  Human Rights and of  the Commissioner for Human Rights (2009).
129 According to the information provided by the UK Judicial Appointments Commission—Judge of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights—Information Pack, available at https://www.judicialappointments.gov.
uk/sites/default/files/sync/basic_page/information_pack_final_0.pdf.
130 Article18b of  the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of  the Council of Europe.
131 Article 72 ACHR.
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The logic of  decentralization applies to attempts to lower the retirement age of  
ECtHR judges. The expiry of  judicial office is set at the age of  70 and is “entrenched” 
directly in the Convention [Art 23 (2)]. Protocol 15, however, changes this rule. It 
introduces a new requirement that candidate judges cannot be older than 65, which 
implies an age limit of  74. It shows that amending the ECHR is not impossible and 
that the Strasbourg Court is not beyond control. However, bad faith amendments can 
be blocked by a state party.132 To address the last technique, the option of  intimidating 
judges exists and cannot be completely prevented. At least ECtHR judges enjoy dip-
lomatic immunity which can be waived only by a decision of  the Court. Such im-
munity should protect the ECtHR judges from intimidation through domestic legal 
proceedings.
Another set of  techniques concerns efforts to make incumbent judges loyal. Four 
main techniques have been identified—reappointment, a promise of  promotion, a 
promise of  future career opportunities, and bribes. The combination of  judicial in-
dependence safeguards and of  JSG protects the Strasbourg Court quite well from 
attempts to tame current judges.
As to the reappointments, after several instances of  governments’ alleged revenge 
(non-reappointment) against their national judges for “wrong” opinions133 and schol-
arly criticism, the possibility of  reappointment was abolished.134 Since 2010, judicial 
terms at the ECtHR are for nine years and are non-renewable.135 Nevertheless, reap-
pointment is not the only career incentive a government can promise to an incum-
bent judge. IC judges—especially if  their term is non-renewable—have to deal with 
the question of  post-IC careers. Thus, governments can put some pressure on judges 
by promising them positions in other institutions.136 It is difficult to prevent this tech-
nique at the CoE level. One precaution is the pension scheme. ECtHR judges who join 
the pension scheme and spend at least five years in office are eligible for a retirement 
pension from the CoE once they reach the age of  65.137 This mechanism should at least 
partially enhance the independence of  the Strasbourg judges since it grants them the 
security of  a pension. Other measures can be taken by the states. Some countries, for 
instance, permit judges going to the ECtHR to suspend their domestic positions, with 
the option to return to their original jobs after serving a term in Strasbourg.138
The technique of  taming judges through promises of  promotion is unavailable since 
the ECtHR enjoys JSG in this area. The selection of  the President and Vice-President(s) 
of  the Court and of  the Chamber Presidents is in the hands of  the plenary Court (Article 
132 Generally Geir Ulfstein & Andreas Føllesdal, Copenhagen—Much Ado about Little? Eur. J. int’l l. tAlk! (Apr 
14, 2018), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/copenhagen-much-ado-about-little/.
133 See Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of  International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of  Human Rights, 
102 Am. pol. sci. rEV. 417, 421 (2008).
134 Dunoff  & Pollack, supra note 127, at 250–51.
135 Article 23 (1) ECHR.
136 Voeten, supra note 125, at 433.
137 For further details, see Article 10 (3) of  Resolution CM/Res(2009)5 on the status and conditions of  ser-
vice of  judges of  the European Court of  Human Rights and of  the Commissioner for Human Rights.
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25 ECHR). Yet another, albeit criminal, way to influence current judges is bribery. The 
potential for corruption is always present and no formal rules can absolutely prevent 
it. The strength of  the ECtHR system in this regard is the relative material security of  
the Strasbourg judges. Nonetheless, it can be suggested that the ECtHR is as cautious 
and transparent as possible in order to prevent to prevent possible corruption scandals, 
which could have particularly damaging effects on the ECtHR’s legitimacy.
From a comparative perspective, an often-used way of  taming a court is court-
packing. However, the employment of  such a technique in the ECtHR context is 
highly unlikely. Again, it is due to the decentralization of  the system and the de facto 
entrenchment of  the number of  judges in Article 20 of  the Convention. However, 
governments aiming to tame the ECtHR can try to place a loyal individual in the po-
sition of  their country’s judge at the Strasbourg Court. In theory, this should not be 
easy, especially due to two safeguards: the Advisory Panel of  Experts on the selection 
of  judges139 and the election of  judges by PACE. The advisory panel advises the states 
and PACE on whether the candidates they shortlist as ECtHR judges meet the required 
criteria. Its views are only recommendatory though. Strasbourg judges are ultimately 
elected by PACE, which consists of  representatives from all the CoE member states, 
and thus the decentralization logic should apply. Yet, in practice the decentralization 
argument is not as strong. As Lemmens put it, “as long as the Convention hallows 
the idea of  democratically elected judges, we have to accept the flip side of  this coin: 
lobbying, political games, international wheeling and dealing.”140 Most importantly, 
as relatively few PACE members participate in the vote, the threshold for lobbying is 
rather low.141 This shortcoming of  the election process should be addressed since the 
ability to control the ECtHR through individual judges can become critical at a certain 
point. The election of  incompetent or biased judges can largely harm the legitimacy 
and reputation of  the Court.142 Furthermore, single judges are quite powerful actors in 
the ECtHR context. They can publish dissenting opinions and, as a part of  the single-
judge formation, they can dismiss applications as manifestly unfounded.143
3.3. Gradual erosion through shifting the discourse and delegitimizing 
a court
The two main strategies of  attacking courts mentioned so far have been rather straight-
forward. Targeting the structural features of  a court aims to limit the chances of  a 
court interfering. Taming a court through its judicial personnel can lead to greater 
judicial deference, harmonizing the decisions of  the court with the preferences of  po-
litical actors and, ultimately, stripping the court of  its de facto veto power. With respect 
139 The panel consists of  seven judicial experts—current or former ECtHR judges or high court judges from 
the states parties.
140 Koen Lemmens, (S)electing Judges for Strasbourg, in sElEcting EuropE’s JudgEs 95, 108 (Michal Bobek 
ed., 2015).
141 Id., at 108; David Kosař, Selecting Strasbourg Judges, in sElEcting EuropE’s JudgEs 120, 154 (Michal Bobek 
ed., 2015).
142 Çalı et al., supra note 81.
143 Article 27 (1) ECHR.
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to the Strasbourg Court, both strategies seem rather unlikely at this point. Although 
the situation is not perfect—the budget and judicial selection are especially problem-
atic—the ECtHR is rather well insulated from attacks due to decentralization, JSG,144 
and institutional safeguards of  judicial independence.
However, such insulation does not mean that the ECtHR cannot be challenged by 
populists. In the context of  the international human rights judiciary in particular, 
there is another way to attack a court—sidelining it by shifting the discourse about the 
court and delegitimizing it, which may lead to gradual erosion of  its authority. Such 
a strategy is slower and less straightforward. However, it is a more realistic and more 
dangerous scenario in the ECtHR context. Whereas the previous two strategies require 
the concerted action of  many governments or measures that can be very costly politi-
cally, attacking the ECtHR through delegitimization is more likely.
A decrease of  social legitimacy can be very threatening for the Strasbourg Court. 
Delegitimizing techniques can shift the discourse about a court and initiate a dan-
gerous spiral—lower legitimacy implies a risk of  reducing the court’s effective power 
in future cases.145 That poses a major challenge for the court’s effectiveness and 
increases the risk of  its marginalization. This makes eventual attacks on the court’s in-
stitutional framework and judicial personnel less costly in political terms and, thereby, 
more likely. In other words, since the social legitimacy of  a court and its diffuse sup-
port serve as a bulwark of  judicial independence, their loss or decrease opens an op-
portunity for further attacks on a court.146
In order to shift the discourse and delegitimize an IC, a number of  techniques can 
be used which broadly fall within two classical categories: exit and voice.147 Exit is a 
straightforward technique of  getting an IC out of  the government’s way. States can 
withdraw from the jurisdiction of  an IC, or exit the international regime guarded by the 
IC.148 Exit can be viewed as a delegitimizing strategy due to its broader consequences. 
Most importantly, it tends to decrease the social legitimacy and authority of  a court, as 
the recent exit-talk surrounding the ICC exemplifies.149 Moreover, if  one state realizes 
the exit option, or even seriously considers it, this may spread and encourage other 
states to do so.150 In addition, exit can lead other states parties to restrict the jurisdic-
tion of  an IC in order to prevent future exits.151 Even if  a state does not exit in the end, 
144 In the ECtHR’s case, JSG was identified as a strength bolstering the Strasbourg Court’s independence 
and authority. Generally, however, JSG is a double-edged sword that can also diminish the internal inde-
pendence of  judges. See Michal Bobek & David Kosař, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in 
Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 gEr. lAw J. 1257 (2014).
145 Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 491.
146 Kelemen, supra note 106, at 45.
147 AlbErt hirschmAn, Exit, VoicE And loyAlty (1970).
148 For example, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the ACHR. Another recent example is 
Burundi’s exit from the ICC. See Sandholtz et al., supra note 97, at 159.
149 Laurence Helfer & Anne Showalter, Opposing International Justice: Kenya’s Integrated Backlash Strategy 
Against the ICC, 17 int. crim. l.rEV. 1 (2017).
150 Latin American countries’ withdrawal from ICSID exemplifies this. See Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 493.
151 See the example of  the SADC Tribunal. Karen Alter, James T. Gathii, & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash against 
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mere exit threats can also be used to intimidate an IC and send it a strong signal of  
discontent.152
Exit threats can be a part of  a more general strategy of  rhetorical criticism of  a court. 
Raising a voice to criticize a court is a powerful rhetorical tool, which can eventually 
damage the authority of  a court among its compliance constituencies. It may be a par-
ticularly effective tool with powerful states, especially as the anti-court rhetoric tends 
to spread.153 A specific way to criticize a court is to mobilize public opinion against 
it.154 On the one hand, ICs have always been criticized, and this is not necessarily bad 
for an IC. Questioning an IC’s conclusions and providing alternative interpretations 
of  international law serve as an important feedback channel.155 ICs should not be 
insulated from criticism. Fair contestation of  their case law contributes to the devel-
opment of  international law and, if  an IC shows that it actually listens, the criticism 
may even be fruitful for its own legitimacy.156 Thus, not all criticism of  the ECtHR can 
be seen as unjustified populist demagoguery. While a clear line can be hard to find, the 
following factors may help to distinguish the two. Although critical, fair contestation 
accepts the main rationale of  the ECHR system—human rights protection beyond the 
state—and respects the ECtHR’s independence. Moreover, productive criticism should 
be led in language allowing mutual accommodation of  differing views, rather than in 
denouncing and using fear-inciting terms.
The last technique is non-compliance with judicial decisions. Although inducing 
compliance is not the only goal of  ICs,157 it remains one of  the central measures of  
their effectiveness, because courts tend to lose legitimacy if  their decisions are rou-
tinely and openly ignored.158 To be clear, partial or delayed compliance with judicial 
decisions seems to be quite a standard outcome in the case of  international human 
rights courts.159 However, it can also be used to challenge an IC’s legitimacy.160 In other 
words, there is a difference between non-compliance resulting from a lack of  expertise 
and institutional capacities161 and non-compliance as a “nullificationist strategy.”162 
Large-scale non-compliance can make a court ineffective, which likely leads to a loss 
152 Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 491.
153 Philip Leach & Alice Donald, Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading? Eur. J. int’l l.: tAlk! (Dec 19, 
2015), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/.
154 Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 493.
155 Mikael Rask Madsen, Bolstering Authority by Enhancing Communication: How Checks and Balances and 
Feedback Loops Can Strengthen the Authority of  the European Court of  Human Rights, in AllocAting Authority 
77 (Joana Mendes & Ingo Venzke eds., 2018).
156 André Nollkaemper, Conversations among Courts: Domestic and International Adjudicators, in thE oxford 
hAndbook of intErnAtionAl AdJudicAtion 524, 536–37 (Cesare Romano et al., 2013).
157 Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of  International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 Am. J. int’l l. 
225 (2012).
158 Voeten, supra note 125, at 436.
159 Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A  Comparison of  the European and Inter-American 
American Courts for Human Rights, 6 J. int’l l. int’l rEl. 83 (2010).
160 Helfer, supra note 124.
161 Dia Anagnostou & Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Domestic Implementation of  Human Rights Judgments in Europe: 
Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter 25 Eur. J. int’l l. 205, 207 (2014).
162 Hirschl supra note 52, at 18.
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of  legitimacy and diffuse support. Even a single “noisy act of  non-compliance” by a 
powerful state can have damaging consequences for a court’s legitimacy.163
The ECtHR’s resilience to the listed delegitimizing techniques is problematic. In 
fact, this area reveals the Strasbourg Court’s greatest vulnerability. The past decade 
gave rise to unprecedented criticism of  the ECtHR, and included many of  the listed 
delegitimizing techniques. Although the ECtHR has been subject to criticism ever 
since its establishment,164 the criticism has recently intensified and a new genre of  
“Strasbourg bashing” has emerged.165 Besides criticism focusing on the legal quality 
of  the ECtHR’s case law and on the judicial virtues of  Strasbourg judges,166 contes-
tation of  the ECtHR has centered around the Strasbourg Court’s lack of  legitimacy 
to interfere with domestic policies due to its international and judicial nature.167 The 
criticism echoes the sovereigntist criticism of  international institutions and critique of  
the undemocratic nature of  judicial review. The Strasbourg Court has been portrayed 
as a foreign court which is not well-placed to assess domestic legal practice. In addi-
tion, it has been questioned whether unelected foreign judges should second-guess 
decisions of  legitimate domestic parliaments.168 This type of  criticism intensified in the 
UK in response to Strasbourg rulings addressing sensitive political topics such as the 
expulsion of  terrorists and prisoners’ voting rights,169 and subsequently migrated to 
other countries, most notably Russia.170
The rising resistance to the ECtHR materialized in the events surrounding the 2012 
Brighton Conference, which discussed the ECtHR’s long-term future. Prior to the con-
ference, a position paper by the UK was leaked to the media.171 The draft included 
passages along the lines of  “a subtle attempt to water-down the Court’s substantive 
jurisdiction.”172 As a result, “a pervasive air of  backlash against the Court suffused 
163 Helfer, supra note 124.
164 See Ed Bates, The Birth of  the European Convention on Human Rights—and the European Court of  Human 
Rights, in thE EuropEAn court of humAn rights bEtwEEn lAw And politics 17 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael 
Rask Madsen eds., 2013).
165 Mikael Rask Madsen, The Challenging Authority of  the European Court of  Human Rights: From Cold War 
Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 l. & contEmp. probs. 141, 174 (2016); Barbara 
Oomen, A Serious Case of  Strasbourg-Bashing? An Evaluation of  the Debates on the Legitimacy of  the European 
Court of  Human Rights in the Netherlands, 20 int’l J. hum. rts 407 (2016).
166 See Luzius Wildhaber, Criticism and Case Over-load: Comments on the Future of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights, in thE EuropEAn court of humAn rights And its discontEnts: turning criticism into strEngth 10 
(Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart, & Julie Fraser eds., 2013).
167 dzEhtsiArou, supra note 80, at 144; Robert Spano, The Future of  the European Court of  Human Rights—
Subsidiarity, Process-Based Review and the Rule of  Law, 18 hum. rts L.R. 473, 478–9 (2018).
168 Popelier et al., supra note 3; Flogaitis et al., supra note 166.
169 Ed Bates, Analysing the Prisoner Voting Saga and the British Challenge to Strasbourg, 14 hum. rts L.R. 
503 (2014).
170 This phase of  the ECtHR’s legitimacy crisis is well-known and widely covered by the existing scholarship, 
thus I do not go into details. For book-length analysis, see thE uk And EuropEAn humAn rights: A strAinEd 
rElAtionship? (Katja S. Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks, & Loveday Hodson eds., 2015); Popelier et al., supra note 
3; Flogaitis et al., supra note 166.
171 James Landale, UK Presses for European Human Rights Convention Changes, bbc nEws (Feb 29, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-17201024.
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the lead up to the Brighton Conference.”173 In the end, the Brighton Declaration was 
a moderate outcome.174 Still, as Madsen states, the Brighton Declaration is extraordi-
nary compared to previous documents as it openly raises the political (and not merely 
technical) dimension of  the question of  the ECtHR’s future, accompanied by very neg-
ative comments.175 It was the first document in the history of  the CoE which included 
measures designed to restrict rather than enhance the ECtHR’s authority.176
Simultaneously, compliance rates with the ECtHR’s judgments worsened too. 
Whereas in the 1990s the ECtHR’s President Ryssdal stated that the ECtHR’s case law 
has “always been complied with,”177 today the Strasbourg Court faces various com-
pliance difficulties, including partial compliance and non-compliance stemming from 
dilatoriness but also from principled resistance.178 Accordingly, scholars speak about 
an implementation crisis in the ECHR system and stress the detrimental effects it has 
on the Court’s caseload and legitimacy.179
All these developments illustrate the ECtHR’s vulnerability in the area of  legitimacy 
challenges. Exit proposals, questioning of  the ECtHR’s reputation, attempts to curtail its au-
thority, and principled refusals to implement the Strasbourg Court’s rulings have all taken 
place in the ECHR system in the last decade and have affected the Strasbourg Court. These 
developments arguably led to a shift of  the center of  gravity in the system in the direction of  
national law and politics.180 Some authors describe it as entering the age of  subsidiarity and 
procedural embeddedness.181 Others argue that the ECtHR became more restrained due to 
the states’ backlash in order to retain the support of  its traditional allies.182 Madsen showed 
that the Strasbourg Court tends to grant states a wider margin of  appreciation.183 Stiansen 
and Voeten support this conclusion and claim that since the Brighton Conference, states 
have also tended to appoint judges who are more restrained.184 Nevertheless, it has appar-
ently not stopped the growing domestic resistance (see later in this section).
173 Laurence Helfer, The Burdens and Benefits of  Brighton, 1 Esil rEflEctions 1 (2012).
174 Id.
175 Madsen, supra note 165, at 169.
176 Helfer, supra note 173.
177 Rolv Ryssdal, The Enforcement System Set up under the European Convention on Human Rights. in compliAncE 
with JudgmEnts of intErnAtionAl courts 67 (Mielle Bulterman & Martin Kuijer eds., 1996).
178 David Kosař & Jan Petrov, Determinants of  Compliance Difficulties among ‘Good Compliers’: Implementation 
of  International Human Rights Rulings in the Czech Republic, 29 Eur. J. int’l L. 397, 399 (2018); Fiona de 
Londras & Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Mission Impossible? Addressing Non-Execution through Infringement 
Proceedings in the European Court of  Human Rights, 66 int’l comp. L.Q. 467, 468 (2017).
179 Basak Cali, Coping with Crisis: Whither the Variable Geomety in the Jurisprudence of  the European Court of  
Human Rights, 35 wisconsin int’l l. J. 237, 241 (2018); Kosař & Petrov, supra note 178.
180 Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present and Future of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights, in thE EuropEAn court of humAn rights bEtwEEn lAw And politics 230 
(Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen eds., 2013).
181 Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of  Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of  Subsidiarity, 14 hum. rts 
l. rEV. 487 (2014); and Spano, supra note 167.
182 Øyvind Stiansen & Erik Voeten, Backlash and Judicial Restraint: Evidence from the European Court of  Human 
Rights, SSRN (2018).
183 Mikael Rask Madsen, Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a New 
Deal on Human Rights in Europe? 9 J. int’l disp. sEttlEmEnt 199 (2018).
184 Stiansen & Voeten, supra note 182.
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Why does discourse about the ECtHR matter? Public discourse about the ECtHR cru-
cially affects the perceptions of  the Strasbourg Court, which determine its social legit-
imacy. As Dzehtsiarou argued, “[h]uman rights tribunals cannot function effectively 
if  they are perceived to be illegitimate.”185 Just like any other (international) court, the 
ECtHR needs legitimacy support for its proper and effective functioning. Legitimacy, as 
the perception that a court’s authority is justified,186 is one of  the crucial elements of  a 
court’s effectiveness and ability to trigger legal changes.187 For legitimate and effective 
functioning, courts need the diffuse support of  the public, which does not depend on 
short-term satisfaction with the outputs of  the court.188
The rise of  populism makes this situation critical since the ECtHR’s greatest weak-
ness matches the greatest strength of  the populists. Populism is well-equipped to dele-
gitimize courts by including them in the narrative of  blame. Populist ideology provides 
justification for anti-court attacks, and the populist political style makes such attacks 
more appealing to the people. Indeed, the populist rhetorical challenges to the ECtHR 
intensified recently, as the following examples demonstrate.
In using the delegitimizing techniques, populist actors often voice the sovereigntist 
critique of  the ECtHR and stress that the Strasbourg Court interferes with national 
policies and restricts the choices of  the people, which makes it incompatible with 
popular sovereignty. Marine Le Pen, the leader of  the French populist party, National 
Rally (previously National Front), stated that “the ECtHR intervenes in our internal 
legal order, we must return to sovereignty in this area.”189 In 2014, she suggested 
that France withdrew from the Convention since the Strasbourg Court had been im-
posing “visions that the people rejects.”190 In a similar vein, Dutch populist Geert 
Wilders described the position of  his party as follows: “[I]f  you are in favor of  a dem-
ocratic constitutional state, you can never be in favor of  the ECHR.”191 His party has 
also repeatedly proposed to exit the ECHR regime.192 In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s 
185 dzEhtsiArou, supra note 80, at 143.
186 Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 gEo. wAsh. int'l l. rEV. 107, 110 
and 115 (2009).
187 Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts, 14 thEorEticAl inquiriEs in 
lAw 437, 440 (2013).
188 Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of  International Courts, 14 thEorEticAl inquiriEs in lAw 411, 
415 (2013); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of  National High 
Courts, 92 Am. pol. sci. rEV. 343 (1998).
189 Ivanne Trippenbach, CEDH: Marine Le Pen veut sortir de la «camisole» des droits de 
l’homme, l’opinion (Jan 18, 2019), available at https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/politique/
cedh-marine-pen-veut-sortir-camisole-droits-l-homme-174826.
190 GPA: Marine Le Pen souhaite que la France quitte la CEDH, lE point (Oct 5, 2014), available at https://
www.lepoint.fr/politique/gpa-marine-le-pen-souhaite-que-la-france-quitte-la-cedh-05-10-2014- 
1869602_20.php.
191 See Debat over EHRM dat nationale wetgeving doorkruist, PVV, available at https://pvv.nl/index.php/compo-
nent/content/article.html?id=6616:debat-over-ehrm-dat-nationale-wetgeving-doorkruist.
192 Janneke Gerards, The Netherlands: Political Dynamics, Institutional Robustness, in Popelier et al., supra note 
3, at 329 (addressing exit proposals in 2013); and Motie van het lid markuszower (May 11, 2017), avail-
able at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34235–9.html (2017 exit proposal during the par-
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Party—often considered populist193—backed a popular initiative, “Swiss law, not for-
eign judges,” which sought to shield Swiss law from international, especially Strasbourg, 
influences by means of  a constitutional amendment. Its adoption could have accelerated 
Switzerland’s withdrawal from the ECHR, but was rejected in the end.194
Importantly, the populist criticism of  the ECtHR often uses very expressive, mor-
alistic terms portraying the Strasbourg Court as a threat. Thierry Baudet—today 
the leader of  Dutch populist party Forum for Democracy—depicted the ECtHR as a 
“ravening monster that, without the slightest legitimacy, overrules scores of  national 
laws and regulations.”195 Jordan Bardella of  the French National Rally referred to 
the Strasbourg Court as a “straitjacket” that France must release itself  from.196 Such 
demonic portrayals are often nourished by those tabloid media which are ideologi-
cally close to the populist parties and contribute to the delegimitazation of  the ECtHR. 
British tabloid The Sun, for example, titled articles reporting about the Strasbourg Court 
“Victory for evil—European judges declare whole-life terms ‘inhumane’” and “Court 
of  Human Frights.”197 In articles about the ECtHR cases, Swiss media used expressions 
such as “human rights mafia” and “castration of  democracy.”198 Sometimes, the pop-
ulist criticism is even outright offensive. Reacting to the ECtHR’s ruling concerning 
the display of  totalitarian symbols, the Speaker of  the Hungarian Parliament labeled 
the ECtHR judges as “some idiots in Strasbourg.”199 Matteo Salvini of  the Italian pop-
ulist party League stated: “I would close the Strasbourg court, it serves no purpose, we 
pay it to hand down one idiotic sentence after another.”200
Oftentimes, populist actors criticize the ECtHR in reaction to particular judgments. 
Rulings touching upon security frequently trigger the critique as human rights law 
limits the “tough on crime” policies. The manifesto of  the UK Independence Party, 
for instance, stipulated withdrawing from the Convention and repealing the Human 
Rights Act to ensure that “the interests of  law-abiding citizens and victims will al-
ways take precedence over those of  criminals.”201 Similarly, Hungarian Prime Minister 
Orbán criticized the ECtHR for declaring life imprisonment without parole a violation 
193 See Laurent Bernhard, Three Faces of  Populism in Current Switzerland, 23 SPSR 509 (2017).
194 Tilamnn Altwicker, Switzerland: The Substitute Constitution in Times of  Popular Dissent, in Popelier et al., 
supra note 3, at 398–99; Constance Kaempfer, Sophie Thirion, & Evelyne Schmid, Switzerland Rejects 
a Popular Initiative ‘Against Foreign Judges’, opinio Juris (Dec 17, 2018), available at http://opiniojuris.
org/2018/12/17/switzerland-rejects-a-popular-initiative-against-foreign-judges/.
195 Baudet, supra note 8.
196 Trippenbach, supra note 189.
197 Graeme Wilson, Victory for Evil, thE sun (Jul 9, 2013), available at https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/
politics/857957/victory-for-evil/; Graeme Wilson, Court of  Human Frights, thE sun (Jan 26, 2012), avail-
able at https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/politics/329478/court-of-human-frights/.
198 Altwicker, supra note 194, at 392–93.
199 See Eszter Polgári, Hungary: ‘Gains and Losses’. Changing the Relationship with the European Court of  Human 
Rights, in Popelier et al., supra note 3, at 308.
200 Strasbourg Court “Useless” Says Salvini, AnsA (Apr 9, 2015), available at http://www.ansa.it/english/
news/politics/2015/04/09/strasbourg-court-useless-says-salvini_07b1abed-c340-443f-b073-
776d80562b81.html.
201 Roger Masterman, The United Kingdom: From Strasbourg Surrogacy Towards a British Bill of  Rights?, in 
Popelier et al., supra note 3, at 464.
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of  Article 3 ECHR.202 He stated that the ruling was “outrageous” and further proof  
that in the European institutions “the rights of  those who commit crimes prevail over 
the rights of  innocents and victims.”203 In the Italian context, Salvini denounced the 
Strasbourg Court as “useless” in reaction to a ruling declaring that Italy condoned 
torture during a police action against anti-globalization protesters.204 He reacted sim-
ilarly after the ECtHR’s judgment in Provenzano, which held in favor of  a mafia boss in 
the context of  extending a restrictive prison regime despite his serious health issues.205 
Salvini interpreted the ruling as “another demonstration of  the uselessness of  this 
European circus.”206
Terrorism-related security concerns represent another area that frequently gives 
rise to strained criticism of  the ECtHR by populist leaders. In France, politicians of  
the National Rally decried that “the ECHR, with the exorbitant influence on our 
jurisdictions, prohibits France from leading the anti-terrorist fight which it wishes.”207 
This area has also been salient in Turkey. In Demirtas, the Strasbourg Court held 
that although the arrest of  the applicant—a representative of  a pro-Kurdish polit-
ical party—was based on a reasonable suspicion of  terrorism-related crimes, his ex-
tended detention was unjustified and was designed to limit Mr Demirtas’s political 
participation. The ECtHR accordingly ordered Turkey to ensure that “the applicant’s 
pre-trial detention is ended at the earliest possible date.”208 In response to this judg-
ment, Turkish President Erdoğan said that the ECtHR’s ruling amounted to sup-
port for terrorism: “Are you following this ECHR? Do you have a ruling on these? No 
country or institution that praises Gulenists has the right to speak of  democracy. This 
isn’t seeking justice, it’s simply terror-loving.”209 Erdoğan rejected the judgment and 
stated—in clear contradiction to Article 46 (1) ECHR—that the Strasbourg Court’s 
rulings are not binding.210
Yet another area inciting the populist delegitimization of  the ECtHR is migra-
tion. Several examples from Hungary illustrate the tension. In 2017, Viktor Orbán 
delivered a speech asking for urgent reforms of  the ECtHR because its judgments were 
a “threat to the security of  EU people and invitation for migrants.”211 Reacting to a 
lawsuit at the ECtHR concerning the deportation of  two asylum seekers, Hungary’s 
202 Magyar v. Hungary, App. No. 73593/10, Eur. ct. hum. rts, May 20, 2014.
203 See Polgári, supra note 199, at 300.
204 Supra note 200.
205 Provenzano v. Italy, App. No. 55080/13, Eur. ct. hum. rts, Oct 25, 2018.
206 Supra note 7.
207 Trippenbach, supra note 189.
208 Demirtas v. Turkey (no. 2), App. No. 14305/17, Eur. ct. hum. rts, Nov 20, 2018, § 283.
209 Turkey’s Erdogan says ECHR ruling on jailed politician supports terrorism, rEutErs (Nov 
21, 2018), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-demirtas/
turkeys-erdogan-says-echr-ruling-on-jailed-politician-supports-terrorism-idUSKCN1NQ1C2.
210 Erdoğan rejects European court’s “non-binding” decision over Demirtaş, hürriyEt dAily nEws (Nov 










niverzita user on 29 O
ctober 2020
State Secretary labeled the litigation as a “Trojan horse” used by “international pro-
migration forces” to dismantle laws protecting Europe.212
On the other hand, populists do not always denounce the Strasbourg Court. 
Sometimes they use it in their favor and even turn to the ECtHR themselves when nec-
essary. In 2018, the Italian League, led by Salvini, announced its intention to turn to 
the ECtHR after the Italian Court of  Cassation confirmed the seizure of  party funds. 
The League’s lawyers stated that the violation of  law in this case was so obvious that it 
would be necessary to go to Strasbourg.213 Another example concerns Andrej Babiš—
the Czech populist Prime Minister who leads a lawsuit in Slovakia because he is listed 
in the historical archives as a collaborator of  the communist secret police. After the 
Slovak Constitutional Court had ruled against Babiš, he filed a complaint with the 
ECtHR seeking justice in Strasbourg, unsuccessfully in the end.214
By and large, the combination of  populist ideology and political style provides a par-
ticularly strong basis for challenging the ECtHR. An overview of  the actual populist 
challenges to the ECtHR reveals the following points. First, it is important that such 
challenges are not limited to populist governments.215 The combination of  technolog-
ical advancements (especially the social media), their skillful utilization by populists, 
and the “cognitive mobilization” of  the people216 increased the capability of  populist 
leaders and parties to communicate with the public directly and, therefore, to affect 
the public sphere and to delegitimize rule of  law institutions such as the ECtHR even if  
they are not in the government. As a result, the challenge of  populist delegitimization 
of  the ECtHR is not limited to Eastern Europe where a number of  governments include 
populists, but it also applies to other parts of  Europe where populist actors have not 
formed the government but have still gained prominence.217 Thus, it can generally be 
said that the populist era broadens the possibilities of  a backlash against ICs—atten-
tion should be paid not only to governmental actors but also to a broader array of  
populist actors across countries.
Next, the instances of  the populist delegitimization critique support the previous 
conclusions about the pragmatic, even opportunistic nature of  populist politics.218 The 
populist criticism usually comes as a reaction to rulings touching upon specific policy 
212 State Secretary Says ECtHR Lawsuit Is the New Method of  Soros and His Network to Undo the European 
Legal Systém, About hungAry (Apr 23, 2018), available at http://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/state-
secretary-says-ecthr-lawsuit-is-the-new-method-of-soros-and-his-network-to-undo-the-european-
legal-system/.
213 Fondi sequestrati, Lega ricorre a Corte diritti Ue, Adnkronos (Nov 10, 2018), available at https://
www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2018/11/10/fondi-sequestrati-lega-ricorre-corte-diritti_
XdwnD5wtx7jQ4GNHy0cdqL.html.
214 Ivana Svobodová, Babiš zůstane v registru agentů STB. Štrasburk odmítl jeho stížnost. rEspEkt (Dec 10, 2018), 
available at https://www.respekt.cz/politika/strasburk-odmitl-babisovu-stiznost-jeho-jmeno-v-registru 
-agentu-stb-zustane.
215 Cf. Heike Krieger, Populist Governments and International Law, 30 Eur. J. int’l L. (forthcoming).
216 Ronald Inglehart, Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity, 3 comp. pol. 45 (1970).
217 Moreover, even if  populists are not in the government, they tend to push the mainstream parties towards 
hardline positions. See Eiermann et al., supra note 5.
218 See supra note 83.
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areas. These are areas central for the local populist narrative of  blame (e.g. migration in 
Hungary) and/or topics that can easily mobilize the political base using the arguments 
of  the populist ideology (typically security). Sometimes the message is the denounce-
ment of  the ECtHR alone, sometimes it is coupled with suggestions for redress. These 
frequently include liberation from the Strasbourg Court’s impact (exit), its ignorance 
(non-compliance), or structural restrictions (talk of  “clipping wings” and “shutting 
down”). Importantly, the mobilization potential is increased by the rhetoric populists 
use. This often stresses the emotional element, employs expressive vocabulary vilifying 
the ECtHR, builds on public fears and anxieties, and channels those feelings against the 
Strasbourg Court and human rights in general. That is crucial since recent research 
shows that invoking fear and anger facilitates persuasion and agreement with the mes-
sage,219 which further increases the potential to mobilize and delegitimize.
The crucial question is: do such delegitimizing challenges really pose a threat to 
the ECtHR? First of  all, some points of  the populist critique are not unfounded, as 
argued in Section 2.2. The extent of  the ECtHR’s evolutive interpretation, stretching 
the scope of  ECHR rights, disregard of  national specificities, and the quality of  the 
Strasbourg Court’s rulings are all legitimate topics that should be raised in debates 
about the future of  the ECHR regime. Their ignorance might actually be detrimental 
to the Strasbourg Court. However, populist actors do not seem to put forward serious 
ideas for reforming the system and re-balancing its democratic and liberal elements. 
The populist comments rather seem to be driven by the “linguistic depreciation 
strategy”220 aiming to mobilize emotions and denounce the ECtHR.
Still, can a critical tweet or speech endanger one of  the most effective ICs in the 
world? The challenge is not the single tweets and rhetorical figures, but rather the 
gradual change of  the discursive frame they may induce, especially in an era of  sig-
nificant demographic and socioeconomic changes in Europe. As Crawford put it, “the 
increasing rhetoric of  skepticism towards international law ... may precipitate a large-
scale retreat into nativism and unilateralism.”221 The combination of  the ideological 
underpinnings and political style allows populists to effectively utilize the aforemen-
tioned social, economic, and identity anxieties of  the people, potentially even across 
borders. The populist narrative of  blame gives meaning to this anxiety and channels 
it into resentment towards the ECtHR and human rights more generally.222 As stated 
above, invoking fear and anger plays a big role in the populist delegitimization of  the 
Strasbourg Court, which further invigorates the resonance of  the critique.
219 See Shana Kushner Gadarian & Bethany Albertson, Anxiety, Immigration, and the Search for Information, 
35 pol. psychol. 133 (2014); Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and 
Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 Am. J. pol. sci. 388 (2005).
220 Altwicker, supra note 194, at 392.
221 James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law, 81 mod. l. rEV. 1, 22 (2018).
222 See Bart Bonikowski, Ethno-nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of  Collective Resentment, 
68 brit. J.  soc. S181 (2017); Tomasz Koncewicz, The Role of  Citizen Emotions in Constitutional 
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Such a shift in the discursive frame surrounding the ECtHR has dangerous long-
term implications since it can distort the social and political sources of  the Strasbourg 
Court’s independence and authority. The populist delegitimization can severely de-
crease the ECtHR’s social legitimacy, which can, in turn, commence the gradual ero-
sion scenario and lend support to non-compliance, violating the political norms of  
non-interference with the ECtHR’s independence, and to further court-curbing.
In a way, the road to the Copenhagen Declaration—the most recent high-level CoE 
document addressing the ECtHR’s future—can be interpreted as a step in this direc-
tion. In November 2017, Denmark took over the CoE’s chairmanship. In the con-
text of  populism-infused domestic debates about the expulsion of  foreign criminals, 
the Danish chairmanship announced its goal to reform the ECHR system and limit 
the ECtHR’s dynamic interpretation practices.223 The subsequent draft declaration 
was depicted by some commentators as an instrument institutionalizing political 
pressure on the ECtHR and an “attempt to handcuff  the Strasbourg judges.”224 The 
final Declaration turned out to be a much more balanced document addressing the 
Strasbourg Court’s core problems.225 Still, although it has not prevailed this time, the 
draft declaration shows that the changing discourse on the ECtHR can affect even the 
highest levels of  CoE politics.
The rhetorical delegitimization strategies can be reinforced by the domestic poli-
tics of  non-compliance in the populist-governed countries. ICs still depend on do-
mestic compliance and constituencies’ cooperation in terms of  giving effect to their 
rulings.226 However, the strategy of  authoritarian populists to “occupy”227 the state 
institutions and restrict civil society considerably problematizes this. To name a few 
examples, populist governments in Hungary and Poland packed the constitutional 
courts, which have acted as the ECtHR’s main compliance partners until recently, and 
managed to shift their ideological positions.228 This has implications for ECHR com-
pliance too. Regarding Hungary, Polgári reports that the treatment of  the ECtHR’s 
case law has become a cleavage in disputes between the judges nominated by the pre-
Orbán Parliament and the new appointees. One of  the new judges even objected to the 
binding nature of  the Strasbourg case law and dissented to every decision where the 
223 Jacques Hartmann, A Danish Crusade for the Reform of  the European Court of  Human Rights, Eur. J. int’l 
l.: tAlk! (Nov 14, 2017), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-danish-crusade-for-the-reform-of-the- 
european-court-of-human-rights/.
224 Alice Donald & Philip Leach, A Wolf  in Sheep’s Clothing: Why the Draft Copenhagen Declaration Must be 
Rewritten, Eur. J.  int’l l.: tAlk! (Feb 21, 2018), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-wolf-in-sheeps-
clothing-why-the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-must-be-rewritten/. For a different view of  the draft 
Declaration, see Mikael Rask Madsen & Jonas Christoffersen, The European Court of  Human Rights’ View of  
the Draft Copenhagen Declaration, Eur. J. int’l l.: tAlk! (Feb 23, 2018), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/
the-european-court-of-human-rights-view-of-the-draft-copenhagen-declaration/.
225 Ulfstein & Føllesdal, supra note 132.
226 Alter, supra note 63, at 20–21 (distinguishing between compliance partners who possess formal powers 
to generate compliance, and compliance supporters who can put pressure on compliance partners).
227 See Müller, supra note 19, at 44.
228 Jan Petrov, Unpacking the Partnership: Typology of  Constitutional Courts’ Roles in Implementation of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights’ Case Law, 14 Eur. const. lAw rEV. 499, 526 (2018).
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majority took the ECtHR’s jurisprudence into account.229 The Russian Constitutional 
Court was even granted an explicit competence to review the compatibility of  the 
ECtHR’s rulings with the constitution.230 Also human rights NGOs—crucial com-
pliance supporters of  the ECtHR—have come under pressure from populist actors 
and their operational power has been severely limited.231 Thus, the populist domestic 
reforms restricting the ECtHR’s compliance partners and supporters might lead to the 
emergence of  additional compliance difficulties and a drop in the Strasbourg Court’s 
social legitimacy.
3.4. Summary: Populism as a distinctive challenge to the ECtHR?
This article argues that the current “explosion” of  populism amounts to more than 
yet another instance of  the sovereigntist critique of  the ECtHR.232 The recent populist 
surge has been rewriting the political map of  Europe,233 which elevates populist resist-
ance to the Strasbourg Court to another level. As this article has shown, the challenge 
does not rest in inventing new court-curbing techniques. Rather, populism is distinc-
tive by its great capacity to distort the ECtHR’s legitimacy and authority. The critique 
is not limited to academic debates or tabloid criticism anymore, but affects the highest 
levels of  politics and public debates in a number of  European countries.
Thus, what makes the populist challenge specific and particularly threatening for 
the Strasbourg Court’s independence and authority is the combination of  (1) the ide-
ological basis of  populism, which results in a coherent constitutional vision and an 
overarching narrative of  blame explaining the current problems of  the people; and (2) 
populists’ widely appealing style of  political communication and its resonance within 
the general public. Consequently, populism has a (3) particularly high capacity to mo-
bilize people (possibly even across countries), channel their resentment against the 
Strasbourg Court, and shift the discursive frame surrounding human rights adjudi-
cation in Europe.
In other words, populism is a thin ideology, which has clear implications for how 
democracy should work and explains why challenging the ECtHR is justified or even 
necessary. The populist message is then communicated in a specific way, building on 
people’s fears and anxieties. Populism addresses often-overlooked issues and provides 
simple explanations and solutions embodied in the narrative of  blame. It has a high 
mobilization capacity stemming from the majoritarian and nationalistic elements of  
229 Polgári, supra note 199, at 317–18.
230 Petrov, supra note 228, at 517–18; Marina Aksenova & Iryna Marchuk, Reinventing or Rediscovering 
International Law? The Russian Constitutional Court’s Uneasy Dialogue with the European Court of  Human 
Rights, 16 int’l J. const. J. 1322 (2018). I mention Russia for the sake of  completeness since some authors 
consider Russia a populist regime. See Neil Robinson & Sarah Milne, Populism and Political Development in 
Hybrid Regimes: Russia and the Development of  Official Populism, 38 int’l pol. sci. rEV. 412 (2017).
231 See numerous examples in Antoine Buyse, Squeezing Civic Space: Restrictions on Civil Society Organizations 
and the Linkages with Human Rights, 22 int’l J. hum. rts 966 (2018).
232 See Hirschl (supra note 52, at 2) who also singles out the populist challenge and argues that it differs from 
earlier grievances against globalization and global constitutionalism.
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populism complemented by the emotional and moralistic tone. The combination of  
these features arms populists with a political toolkit capable of  mobilizing the audi-
ence and channeling people’s fears against the ECtHR. The apparent resonance of  the 
narrative of  blame in many societal segments therefore makes the gradual erosion 
scenario particularly risky, especially since the Strasbourg Court has shown itself  to 
be quite vulnerable to legitimacy challenges. As an IC, the Strasbourg Court is incom-
parably less well-equipped than populist politicians to communicate with and seek 
support from the general public, despite the ECtHR’s recent educative efforts. Populist 
actors have better resources and virtually non-stop media access. The Strasbourg 
Court, on the other hand, has limited resources in terms of  time (caseload), finances 
(budgetary issues), and communication skills, and a different primary mission than 
seeking popular support. The problem is even more intense since the ECHR system 
suffers from the heightened populist critique of  the European Union. The lack of  ge-
neral understanding of  the relationship between the EU and the CoE and the lack of  
awareness that the Strasbourg Court is not a part of  the EU contributes to the spillover 
effect of  criticism paid to the EU.234 Moreover, with regard to populist governments’ 
tendency to change the institutional environment and limit checks on their power, 
the ECtHR’s delegitimization can be only a first step, which commences the gradual 
erosion scenario. Decreasing social legitimacy implies lower costs for non-compliance 
with the Strasbourg Court’s decisions, and widespread non-compliance opens the 
door for further court-curbing and sidelining of  the ECtHR.
To make it clear, this article does not argue that ICs should be free from criticism. 
Debates about the ECtHR’s case law and functioning are crucial feedback mechanisms 
for the Strasbourg Court.235 As argued above, criticizing the ECtHR’s eventual ac-
tivism, extensive dynamic interpretation, and effects of  international judicialization 
on democratic and identitarian deficits are legitimate points in these debates. However, 
as Section 3.3. showed, the populist challenges are of  a different kind. Rather than 
discussing the right balance within the ECHR system, the populist critique focuses 
on an antagonistic portrayal of  the Strasbourg Court (“straitjacket”, “monster”) not 
acknowledging its rationale and even amounting to conspiracy theories (“human 
rights mafia”, “Trojan horse”), and using the critique of  the ECtHR for political mo-
bilization and stressing the us versus them othering (see the remarks on the rights of  
migrants and criminals).
4. Conclusion
The ECtHR has been criticized from several positions for some time now. This article 
has argued that the recent explosion of  populism in Europe poses an even greater 
challenge to the Strasbourg Court. The rise of  populism does not only imply intensified 
234 Johan Karlsson Schaffer, Andreas Føllesdal, & Geir Ulfstein, International Human Rights and the Challenge 
of  Legitimacy, in thE lEgitimAcy of intErnAtionAl humAn rights rEgimEs 1, 11 (Andreas Føllesdal, Johan 
Karlsson Schaffer, & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2014).
235 Madsen, supra note 155.
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critique of  the ECtHR. The combination of  populist ideology and political style has 
been incrementally leading to a shift in the discursive frame surrounding the ECtHR 
and to questioning of  some of  the basic rationale of  the ECHR system. Given the 
populists’ tendency to change the institutional landscape and remove limitations on 
their power, the populist challenge to the ECtHR seems significant and pressing.
Nevertheless, the subsequent stocktaking of  the ECtHR’s institutional design 
showed that the Strasbourg Court is rather well protected from the most common 
court-curbing strategies targeting structural features of  a court and judicial per-
sonnel. With the exception of  severe problems regarding the ECtHR’s budget and 
selection of  judges, the high number and diversity of  the ECHR’s State Parties (decen-
tralization), rather high level of  judicial self-governance, and institutional safeguards 
of  judicial independence insulate the ECtHR relatively well from attempts to prevent 
the court from effectively reviewing domestic policies or to “tame” the court.
However, there is another strategy of  contesting the ECtHR—sidelining the 
Strasbourg Court through delegitimization and a gradual erosion of  its authority and 
social legitimacy, which is particularly troubling for the ECtHR in the context of  pop-
ulism. Populists’ greatest strength—a widely appealing narrative criticizing counter-
majoritarian institutions and providing justification for attacking courts—meets the 
Strasbourg Court’s greatest weakness—vulnerability to legitimacy challenges. The 
populist challenge is particularly threatening for the Strasbourg Court’s independence 
and authority, due to a combination of  the ideological basis of  populism (which results 
in a coherent constitutional vision and an overarching narrative of  blame explaining 
the current problems of  the people and providing their solutions) and an appealing 
style of  political communication and its resonance within the general public. As a 
result, populism has a high capacity to mobilize people (possibly even across coun-
tries), channel their resentment against the Strasbourg Court, and shift the discursive 
frame surrounding human rights adjudication in Europe. That can lead to a decrease 
in the ECtHR’s social legitimacy, which can, in turn, lend support to violating the po-
litical norms of  non-interference with the Strasbourg Court’s independence and to 
further court-curbing. In short, the populist delegitimization strategies can lead to the 
ECtHR’s gradual erosion by interfering with the social and political sources of  its inde-
pendence and authority.
This article has focused on a diagnosis of  the populist challenge to the ECtHR. 
Rather than finding ways to save the ECHR project, it made the prerequisite step and 
suggested what we should concentrate on in the age of  populism when debating 
the future of  the ECHR regime. The crucial question for future research is how the 
Strasbourg Court, CoE, and other actors should deal with the threat of  the gradual 
erosion scenario. One possible development is that the pro-ECHR actors will use the 
populist critique constructively—as a “mirror”236—and navigate the reform process 
of  the ECtHR in a direction that addresses some overlooked problems and takes seri-
ously the concerns that lead many people to support populist actors. Another, much 
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more worrisome version is that the populist leaders will succeed in the gradual erosion 
scenario and achieve a diminishing of  the ECtHR’s authority and independence. The 
latter scenario could hardly be interpreted as a victory for the people and democracy. 
It would eliminate one of  the last checks on authoritarian populist governments and 
further unleash the “executive aggrandizement” typical of  countries governed by au-
thoritarian populists,237 which is miles away from a democratic system responsive and 
accountable to the people.
237 Tarunabh Khaitan, Executive Aggrandizement in Established Democracies: A  Crisis of  Liberal Democratic 
Constitutionalism, 17 int’l J. const. l. 342 (2019).
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